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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Golden Valley County vs. Miller: Action to quiet title to town
property for which tax deed had issued to County. Notice of expira-
tion of period of redemption had previously been served personally
on defendant, but though the notice read: "I, Win. G. McConkey,
County Auditor, give notice," the only signature was the printed line,
"County Auditor." HELD: Notice was insufficient, not being
signed, and the "prima facie evidence" rule will not support the deed
issued. Deed is void, but tax lien is not destroyed.
Hazlett as Receiver vs. Mathieu: Action to foreclose mortgage
of dwelling house occupied by family of defendant except for short
period of time in 1923. The husband evidently intended to move to
Minnesota, and did open a business there, but the wife and children
did not go until later and only remained a few months, also testifying
that they never intended to leave permanently. No attempt was made
to rent or sell the dwelling. The husband returned to North Dakota,
cleaned and repaired the dwelling for occupancy. The evidence dis-
closes that the wife never appeared before a Notary at the time of
execution of the mortgage, and in no manner acknowledged such
execution. HELD: To constitute an acknowledgment by the wife
of a mortgage upon the homestead she must appear before the officer
and in some manner make admission to such officer of the fact that
she executed the instrument; and that mere temporary absence from
a homestead will not forfeit the right of homestead exemption where
there is a constant abiding intention to return.
Allis-Chalmers Co. vs. Frank: Defendant purchased a tractor
and set of plows from Plaintiff, paying part and giving chattel mort-
gage. The contract contained certain warranties, said nothing about
the goods being reasonably fit for the required purpose, but con-
tained provisions that the number and date of purchase should be
recorded with the company within ten days and that retention for six
days after .first day's use should be construed as fulfillment of warran-
ties. Tle tractor did not work to satisfaction of defendant, but he con-
tinued to use it, and there was no evidence of attempt at rescission until
action to foreclose was commenced. HELD: Aside from the statute
(Sec. 5991a, Supp.) there was an implied warranty that the goods were
reasonably fit for the purpose; that the six-day provision was not
binding, but that a reasonable time after delivery must be allowed for
inspection and testing; that there was no rescission or offer to return
the goods, and the offer to return must include all of the goods where
the contract is an entire one. Case remanded for further proceedings,
in which other remedies specified in Section 6oo2a69 may be made
available by amendment of pleadings.
Ravely vs. Isensee: Construes Sections 7550, 7555 and 7556 of
Compiled Laws. One K. sold personal property for printing plant to
G. Company. No reservation of title was made. R. was employed as
printer, and took a chattel mortgage for back pay amounting to
$1,245.13. After sale, K. gave a mortgage to S. Bank. R. started
foreclosure by advertisement, but prior to date of sale, K. took the
property under warrant of attachment in suit for balance of purchase
price. R. then began foreclosure by action, and obtained a warrant for
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seizure. All parties were made defendants. Defendants applied for
discharge of warrant of seizure and gave bond for immediate return of
the property. Defendants I. and A. were sureties on such bond. R.
obtained money judgment against G. Company and for foreclosure
against all defendants. On appeal this was affirmed. Meanwhile the
property was sold in case of K. vs. G. Company. Suit is on the bond
given, the contention being that the only remedy R. had was available
under Section 7550 Compiled Laws, and the bond given had no binding
force. HELD: That Section 7550 is for benefit of Sheriff and
is not applicable to this cause. Defendants did not litigate validity of
warrant obtained by R., but gave bond for immediate restitution of
property, and agreed to pay the amount of any judgment recovered,
as provided in the second part of Section 7556. The bond became
security for any judgment that might be rendered in favor of R., and
the obligation of the sureties to pay became absolute with the entry of
such judgment.
SEEMS "PHUNNY" NOW
One Berry was arrested for violation of an ordinance prohibiting
the use of automobiles between sunset of one day and sunrise of the
next. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which was discharged.
The learned judge (047 Cal. 523) said, in part:
"In the case at bar there is nothing to show the unreasonableness
of the ordinance, and the burden is on petitioner to show that it is
unreasonable. There is nothing which shows with any particularity
what an automobile is, and, of course, a court could not declare un-
reasonable a regulation about something of which it has no knowl-
edge. . . We may assume to have what is common or current knowl-
edge about an automobile. It's use as a vehicle for traveling is com-
paratively recent. It makes an unusual noise. It can be and usually
is made to go at great velocity-at a speed many times greater-than
that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals-and beyond doubt it is
highly dangerous when used on country roads, putting to great hazard
the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel in vehicles
drawn by horses. Fearful accidents to persons driving animals which are
frightened into unmanageable terror are of common occurrence; and
while there are usually laws regulating and limiting the speed at which
they may be driven, it is a matter of common knowledge that these
laws are frequently violated, and that it is exceedingly difficult for
officers, even in the day-time, to stop them when going at forbidden
speed and arrest the drivers. This would be much more difficult
in the night-time. Moreover, in the night-time even those drivers of
automobiles who might be considerate of the safety of others would
not be able to see an approaching team in time to take the proper
precautions. . . Of course, if the use of automobiles gradually becomes
more common, there may come a time when an ordinance like the one
in question would be unreasonable. As country horses are frequently
driven into cities and towns many of them will gradually become
accustomed to the sight of automobiles, and the danger of their use
will grow less . . but we are not prepared to say judicially that under
present conditions the ordinance is so unreasonable as to be void."
' NEW YORK'S NEW PAROLE LAW
The New State Parole Law of New York went into effect July ist,
but applies only to those sentenced after that date. The Panel, monthly
